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In this paper we simulate a central bank subject to the misperception
that prices are indexed to past inflation in periods when firms are
unable to re-optimise. It thinks, in other words, that inflation is
intrinsically persistent. The central bank sets monetary policy
optimally subject to this belief. The central bank updates its beliefs
about indexation using a constant gain learning scheme. The data
generated by such policy lead to beliefs about inflation persistence
being effectively self-confirming in a wide variety of setttings. These
results offer a tentative answer to why it appears that inflation is
persistent at some times and in some countries, and at others not. The
answer is that policymakers sometimes believe inflation to be
persistent, and sometimes do not.
* This paper is preliminary and incomplete - please do not quote without the authors'
permission. We thank, without prejudicing, for helpful conversations, Martin Ellison,
Richard Harrison, Jan Vlieghe. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the Bank of England nor the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee.1 Introduction
In this paper we demonstrate how a central bank￿ s misperception that there is intrinsic in￿ a-
tion persistence can be self-con￿rming. Our results sketch an explanation for why in￿ ation
persistence appears in the data in some countries and for some monetary regimes, but not in
others, and why monetary policy is correspondingly accommodative of shocks to in￿ ation.
The story we tell is of a central bank who begins with the notion that there is indexation
in price-setting: that when ￿rms are constrained from reoptimising prices, they uprate their
prices by some linear function of past observed in￿ ation. Our central bank is engaged in a
process of perpetual learning about the value of the coe¢ cient on past in￿ ation in this linear
function. Each period, monetary policy is set optimally, conditional on this belief, with the
quali￿cation that the uncertainty in its estimates, and the impact of monetary policy on the
future value and precision of these estimates is ignored. We simulate a central bank behaving
like this in three realities, none of which feature indexation. In one, prices are set a la Calvo
(1983). In another, prices are ￿ exible. In a third, prices are set according to a model devised
by Juillard et al (2006). In that model, just as in Calvo (1983), ￿rms receive a signal that
they can re-optimise prices. But in addition, ￿rms also get to choose the linear indexation
function that they get to use in the future. In all three realities, consumers and ￿rms are
rational and take expectations over the central bank￿ s learning process. We solve the resulting
non-linear rational expectations system using a parameterised expectations algorithm. Each
model is peturbed by a shock to the desired mark-up of ￿rms - which monetary policy seeks
to respond to in what it thinks is the appropriate way. We experiment with white noise and
persistent processes for this disturbance, where in each case we ensure that the policymaker
knows with certainty the law of motion for this shock.
In many of our settings, the belief that in￿ ation is persistent is e⁄ectively self-con￿rming.
In some cases, there is a tendency for central bank beliefs about the indexation parameter to
fall, but this is usually very slow, and even (under ￿ exible prices) in￿nitessimally so. With
persistence in our mark-up process, we can generate ￿ uctuations in beliefs about in￿ ation
persistence.
Our work is most immediately inspired by Cho et al (2002). They show how a high
in￿ ation equilbrium is the outcome of a process in which a policymaker￿ s misconception that
there is a long run Philips Curve (which suggests it is worth buying lower unemployment
with higher in￿ ation) is self-con￿rming. Ellison and Yates (2007) introduced a motive for
stabilisation into that model and showed how the high in￿ ation equilibrium was also one in
which changed the higher moments of in￿ ation, not just its mean: in their setting, the high
in￿ ation state was also one in which it was more volatile. In our paper, we set up a similar
2thought experiment to see if a misperception about a higher moment of in￿ ation, this time
in￿ ation persistence, can be self-con￿rming. Our answer is a quali￿ed yes.
Our focus on in￿ ation persistence derives from the widespread interest documenting and
accounting for it. One aspect of this is the work establishing that monetary policy shocks
have protracted e⁄ects on real variables and on in￿ ation. (See, for example, Christiano et al
(1999)). This was noted to be inconsistent with the sticky price models of Calvo (1983) and
Rotemberg (1983). Non-microfounded models like Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and Fuhrer and
Moore (1995) were advanced as being more data-congruent. Later, the indexation model was
put forward as a way to modify the sticky price model. This feature was incorporated into
wage and price setting, and into a medium scale DSGE model that featured other frictions by
Christiano et al (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
However, a line of thought questioning the validity of indexation-induced instrinsic in￿ ation
persistence has developed. This line of thought begins by noting that in￿ ation persistence
di⁄ers across countries (Levin and Piger (2003)) and across monetary regimes (Benati, 2008).
It further notes that indexation is incompatible with the micro-evidence on price setting. A
crude consensus from that literature is that prices at the ￿rm level do not change continuously,
as predicted by the indexation model, but in discreet jumps, in between which they remain
unchanged. (See, for example, Alvarez et al (2006)). Finally, Dittmar et al (2005) noted
that reduced form in￿ ation persistence can result even in a ￿ exible price model if monetary
policy is chosen appropriately, reinforcing the idea that this econometric evidence in and of
itself was not enough to verify the sticky price indexation model.
The argument that in￿ ation persistence is a function of the monetary regime - an argument
that explains why persistence varies across countries and monetary regimes - begs the question
why regimes might choose in￿ ation to be persistent if there was no need for it to be. Our
paper o⁄ers a tentative answer. In￿ ation is persistent because at some times and in some
places policymakers have believed it to be so.
2 The Model
We sketch the models we use only brie￿ y, and con￿ne the bulk of our attention to what is
di⁄erent about this set up from those that preceed it. In essence, we take the familiar model
of indexation, and imagine that the central bank is deluded into thinking it holds; we model
a central bank such as this in 3 di⁄erent, familiar price setting realities: Calvo (1983); an
approximation to ￿ exible prices which is Calvo (1983) but with the probability of resetting
prices each period set to be very close to 1; and Juillard et al (2007).
32.1 Households
Our household set up is common to all three of the ￿ realities￿that our deluded central bank
operates in, and indeed the housholds in reality behave just as the central bank assumes them
to.
There is a continuum of identical in￿nitely lived households with access to complete ￿nan-














Households have rational expectations. In particular, they know that the central bank is
operating under the wrong model of the economy.
The period budget constraint faced by the representative household in t=0,1,2,... is
Z 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di + QtBt ￿ Bt￿1 + WtNt + Jt
and to ensure solvency we have
lim
T!1
Et [Qt;t+TBt+T] ￿ 0









































and in their loglinearized form are
wt ￿ pt = ￿ct + ’nt
ct = Et [ct+1] ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et [￿t+1]g)
it ￿ ￿logQt + log￿
Taking the Euler equation and imposing the equilibrium condition yt = ct we obtain the
dynamic IS curve, which can be expressed in terms of the "welfare-relevant" output gap, which
is de￿ned as follows. Letting yt be output, de￿ne yn
t to be the output level that would attain
in the absence of nominal frictions and ye
t to be the output level that would attain in the
absence of nominal frictions and all other distortions. We de￿ne the output gap to be ~ yt ￿
yt ￿ yn
t and the welfare-relevant output gap to be xt ￿ yt ￿ ye
t. Clearly ~ yt ￿ xt + (ye
t ￿ yn
t )1.
Thus, assuming constant technology (￿ye
t ￿ 0) we obtain
xt = Et [xt+1] ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et [￿t+1])
2.2 Firms
We examine equilibrium behaviour under three speci￿cations of the "true" underlying model
which di⁄er only in terms of the ￿rms￿pricing protocols (the IS curve and policy rule are
unchanged across speci￿cations). We begin by describing the common core of our three speci-
￿cations, before outlining the di⁄ering pricing assumptions. The descriptions will be brief and
we refer the reader to the appendix for more thorough derivations.
There is a continuum of ￿rms i 2 [0;1], with each ￿rm producing a di⁄erentiated good
with an identical technology, assumed to take the form:
Yt(i) = Atf(Nt(i)) = AtNt(i)
1￿￿
The variable cost of production is given by the wage bill






1In what follows I loosely interpret the gap between ye
t and yn
t to be due to time varying markups (see Gali
() page ?) and assume that there exists a tax that ensures that there are no competitive distortions in the
non-stochastic steady state. Note that this does not preclude competitive distortions but simply implies that
they are zero in steady state.






























and, subject to pricing constraints to be discussed below, the ￿rm attempts to maximize a
suitably expected future stream of these period pro￿ts. Firms have rational expectations and
forecast future in￿ ation under full knowledge of the central bank￿ s wrong model.
Now, following Calvo (1983) we assume that in any period each ￿rm faces a certain prob-
ability, ￿, that it will not be able to reoptimize its pricing structures. Given that a ￿rm was
last able to reoptimize in period t the price that prevails in future periods prior to the next
reoptimization is to some extent beyond the control of the ￿rm. The exact protocol for how a
￿rm￿ s price evolves between optimizations is the dimension along which our speci￿cations of
the true underlying economy di⁄er.
2.2.1 Three Di⁄erent Models of Price Setting
Our policy-maker wrongly believes that the true model of the economy is a Calvo pricing
model with backward-looking price indexation. We consider three alternative realities for price
setting - simple Calvo pricing without indexation, ￿ exible prices and the model of Juillard et
al (2007) where ￿rms choose not just a new price when they re-optimise but also a price path
slope, which determines how their price evolves when they are unable to optimise in future.
Below we brie￿ y outline each of the three models in turn.
Speci￿cation 1: Calvo Pricing The pricing protocol in our ￿rst speci￿cation that of the
familiar basic New Keynesian framework with monopolistically competitive ￿rms who, in any
given period, have a certain probablity ￿ of being unable to reoptimize their price. This setup
gives rise to the following aggregate supply relation, known as the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (NKPC), again expressed in terms of the welfare relevant output gap.
￿ = ￿xt + ￿Et [￿t+1] + "t
6Speci￿cation 2: Flexible Prices We choose to model ￿ exible prices as a special case of
Speci￿cation 1 with the probability of a ￿rm being able to reset its price being set to a level
just below 1. Numerically, this model behaves just as the ￿ ex price model, and approximating
it this way and avoids having to build separate code to simulate this model under central bank
learning.
Speci￿cation 3: Juillard et al (2007) While the previous pricing models are familiar
within the literature, Juillard et al (2007) is less well known. Hence, we provide a brief
description of the pricing structure as well as detailing the structural equations to which it
gives rise.
Firms maximize the expectation of a suitably discounted stream of pro￿ts in the contin-
gencies in which they are unable to reoptimize (determined by a Calvo mechanism). On the
occasions when they are able to reoptimize, ￿rms (indexed by i) not only choose a new price,
Pt (i), for the current period but also a "slope", vt (i), of the path taken by the ￿rm￿ s price
until the next opportunity to reoptimize. Thus, if ￿rm i last set its price and slope in time t
then its price pro￿le in future periods before the ￿rm is next able to reoptimize is given by
Pt;t+1 (i) = Pt (i)vt (i)
Pt;t+k (i) = Pt (i)v
k
t (i)
The above protocol leads to three (log-linearized) structural equations involving in￿ ation,
￿t, a slope variable vt, and an inertial variable  t that captures the e⁄ects of slopes chosen in
previous periods by ￿rms who have not yet been allowed to reoptimize2
Etvt+1 = ￿v1￿t + ￿v2vt + ￿v3xt + ￿v4 t + ￿v5"t
Et￿t+1 = ￿￿1￿t + ￿￿2vt + ￿￿3xt + ￿￿4 t + ￿￿5"t
 t = ￿ 1 t￿1 + ￿ 2vt￿1
We simulate using this pricing protocol because it has the nice feature that indexation is a
function of monetary policy. It therefore seems ripe for generating self-con￿rming equilbria:
if monetary policy starts out generating in￿ ation persistence, then a model with indexation
endogenous to monetary policy has the potential to con￿rm this. We use the other pricing pro-
tocols because it serves to illustrate that such equilibria can emerge without any endogeneity
between nominal rigidity in price setting and monetary policy.
2WE slightly abuse the notation here with vt now representing the log linearized slope
72.3 The Central Bank
2.3.1 The Policy Problem
The central bank is unaware that in reality prices are set according to the models set out
















￿t ￿ ^ ￿t￿t￿1 = ￿xt + ￿Et [￿t+1 ￿ ^ ￿t￿t] + "t
xt = Et [xt+1] ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et [￿t+1])







Note that the minimization is subject to a correctly perceived dynamic IS curve, a cor-
rectly perceived stochastic process for distortions and an incorrectly perceived New Keyne-
sian Phillips Curve amended for the e⁄ects of indexation. In addition, note that the quasi-
di⁄erencing parameter used by the central bank in its loss function is its current indexation
parameter belief, ^ ￿t. Although none of the model speci￿cations we consider feature indexa-
tion, the central bank behaves as if it is operating within a NKI model with a ￿xed ￿ equal
to its current belief, ^ ￿t. Note that we adopt the assumption of "anticipated utility", which
implies that the central bank behaves as if its current belief, ^ ￿t, will be unchanged in the
future despite the fact that, as discussed in the next section, this belief will evolve according
to data realizations; and note too that the central bank treats its current estimate of ￿ as if
it were instead known with certainty.
As shown in the appendix, one can derive the rule that the central bank follows when
setting rates in terms of the states it observes at the beginning of the period (￿t￿1;"t). This
representation takes the form
it = ￿1 (^ ￿t)￿t￿1 + ￿2 (^ ￿t)"t (2)
where ￿1 and ￿2 are functions of the parameters of the central bank￿ s problem above and, thus,
depend on ￿.
Finally, note that in the equilibrium of the NKI model with indexation parameter equal
to ^ ￿t and with policy set according to (2), in￿ ation evolves with the following structure
3We assume that policy is being undertaken under discretion.
8￿t = ^ ￿t￿t￿1 + ￿q"t (3)
q ￿
1
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿2
2.3.2 Central Bank Learning
Following Gaspar et al (2006) we recognize that, as indicated by (3), in￿ ation should evolve
as an AR(1) process under optimal discretionary policy in the NKI model. Consequently, in
Step 5 above, we posit that the central bank updates its ￿ belief using a recursive algorithm
based on this form. Speci￿cally, we assume the central bank uses constant gain, stochastic
gradient learning (Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). This implies that
^ ￿t+1 = ^ ￿t + ￿￿t￿1 (~ ￿t ￿ ^ ￿t￿t￿1) (4)
~ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿q"t (5)
where ￿ represents the constant gain.
This model is equivalent to a least squares learning model where the precision matrix R
is set equal to the identity every period. That model is popular because under decreasing
gain it typically converges to rational expectations. Here, since we are modelling a central
bank misperception, convergence to RE is not relevant. We opted for stochastic gradient
learning also for practical reasons. It is often found in learning applications that simulation
of the recursion for Rt runs into numerical problems - Rt can become singular easily - and we
found the same problem. As a ￿nal remark on this feature of the model, note that the R
matrix serves the same purpose as (X0X )￿1 in a least squares regression. So omiiting it is
like ommitting the correction for precision.
Note that we assume that the central bank sees the shock to the desired mark-up "t and
therefore it makes forecast errors not because of this but because it persists in believing in the
indexation model even though this model is incorrect.
2.4 Timing Protocol
We assume that the timing protocol within a given period is
￿ Step 1:
Period t begins. At this point the previous period￿ s in￿ ation rate, ￿t￿1, is known to all
agents and the central bank has a given belief, ^ ￿t.
9￿ Step 2:
A shock, "t, to the underlying distortions in the economy occurs and is known to all
agents.
￿ Step 3:
Aware of the economy￿ s state st = (￿t￿1;"t) the policymaker sets the interest rate
according to his misspeci￿ed model and belief, ^ ￿t.
￿ Step 4:
The private sector makes its consumption and pricing decisions, resulting in realized
aggregate in￿ ation, ￿t, and output, yt.
￿ Step 5:
Observing the data realizations, the central bank updates its belief to ^ ￿t+1.
￿ Step 6:
Period t ends.
2.5 Model Solution Method
We assume a fully rational private sector. They take rational expectations over the central
bank￿ s misperceptions and its perpetual learning. The resultant model is nonlinear and this
prevents us using standard linear rational expectations solvers to characterize the equilib-
rium. We solve the model using the parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA) developed
by, among others, den Haan and Marcet (1990). In this approach the conditional expectation
functions are approximated by parametric functions with the values of the parameters being
determined by the requirement that they are consistent with the data they induce. We use
a variant of the PEA advocated by Maliar and Maliar (2003). Their method incorporates
moving bounds for the values of endogenous variables in the iterations of the PEA. This is
a way to enhance the convergence properties of the model without relying on a good initial
guess for the parameters of the expectations functions. The moving bounds involve impos-
ing initially tight bounds for permissable realizations of endogenous variables and gradually
widening them if the bounds are hit. The bounds prevent explosive paths that result from
the badly misspeci￿ed initial belief paramterizations from hijacking the search for the correct
equilibrium4.
4Note that the algorithm below de￿nes a naive application of the PEA in that it is advisable to repeat Steps 2
and 3 to obtain convergence under many di⁄erent sets of shocks. The rationale for this is that we want to ensure
10Algorithm 1 PEA with Bounds
Step1 (Functional Form)
1a Choose parametric functional forms to approximate the expectations functions: ￿ (￿;!) : Rnstate !
Rne
Step2 (Initialization)
2a Initialize the parameters, of the approximate expectations function, !0
2b Initialize the central bank￿ s initial beliefs, ^ ￿
0
2c Choose initial bounds for endogenous variables, (z0
min;z0
max) 2 Rnjump+nend ￿ Rnjump+nend
Step3 (PEA Simulation Loop)
3a Set i = 1
3b Draw nsim structural shocks from the appropriate distributions








and the approximate expectations functions under parame-
terization !i￿1.
3d Using this data, estimate the parameters of the approximate expectations functions, call this
estimate ^ !.
3e Update the parameterization using a convex combination of the new estimate and the previous
parameter vector: !i = ￿^ ! + (1 ￿ ￿)!i￿1.











3g If ￿(!i;!i￿1) < tol for some metric ￿, then stop and record !i. Otherwise continue.
3h If i exceeds a pre-speci￿ed iterations limit then abandon this attempt at PEA convergence and
record the failure to converge. Otherwise, set i = i + 1 and continue iterating through the
loop.
that the various PEA loops with di⁄erent random draws lead to approximately the same parameterization of
the expectations functions and moments of endogenous varaibles. Intuitively, this is because we want to be
con￿dent that we have found an equilibrium, since, provided that the equilibrium is unique, all of the PEA
algorithms should converge to approximately the the same point.
5If, say, xt struck xi￿1








We calibrate our model and set parameters to the following values:
Parameter Interpretation Value
￿ Exponent on labour in production function 0.66
￿ Discount factor 0.99
￿ Price elasticity of substitution 10
￿ Probability of not being able to reoptimize 0.7
￿ Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion 2
￿ Inverse of Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply 1
￿ Weight on output gap in policymaker￿ s loss function 0.5
￿" S.D. of shock to underlying distortions 0.01
^ ￿0 Initial central bank belief ?
^ ￿0 Initial central bank intercept coe¢ cient belief 0
￿ Gain 0.02
In all cases we are guided by previous authors who have used models of this form. [Cita-
tions to follow in later draft]. We found it necessary to choose a lowish value for the gain in
order to ensure reliable convergence of our PEA. But this value is not far o⁄ the 0.03 value
used by, for example, Orphanides and Williams, in the context of private sector learning. The
initial central bank belief is left blank in the table: in our simulations below we experiment
with a variety of initial beliefs. In our baseline results reported here we choose to impose a
non-microfounded value for the weight on the output gap in the policymaker￿ s loss function.
But we found that adopting a much lower microfounded weight leaves the qualitative results
we report below unchanged, and has little quantitative e⁄ect either.
3 Results
With the learning process and optimal policy as speci￿ed above, we found that (i) ^ ￿t was
quickly learned to its boundary value of 1 in all models of price setting; (ii) it was di¢ cult
to get the PEA algorithm to converge; (iii) the equilibrium in all models of price setting
generated positive steady state in￿ ation. This itself is indicative of the capacity for self-
con￿rming equilibria to emerge in a model of central bank learning, where the central bank is
deluded in the way we constrain them to be. However, we diagnosed these outcomes as being
the result of our central bank misattributing in￿ ation persistence for the positive steady state
in￿ ation that emerges in equilibrium. That the central bank would persist in being so deluded
12seemed unappealling and tantamount to rigging the model in favour of getting self-con￿rming
in￿ ation persistence. For this reason, we implemented the following model for central bank
learning and optimal policy:
it =
b ￿t
1 ￿ b ￿t















(~ ￿t ￿ b ￿t ￿ ^ ￿t￿t￿1) (7)
These equations include an intercept in the central bank￿ s in￿ ation equation, and a corre-
sponding intercept in the interest rate rule. In all the equilibria that we discuss below, these
intercepts are learned to zero. So the equilibrium policy rules and perceived laws of motion
for in￿ ation are as stated earlier.
3.1 Calvo
Our ￿rst set of results is where ￿rms set prices according to the Calvo (1983) model. The
chart below initialises central bank beliefs about the (non existent) indexation parameter at
^ ￿0 = 0:7. We see that there is a very slow but steady learning of ^ ￿t down: the central bank￿ s
estimate falls by a little under 0.07 in 50k periods.











Central Bank's gamma Belief
^ ￿0 = 0:7, Calvo pricing
The same pro￿le is observed for other initial central bank beliefs.
Next, we inject persistence into the mark-up shock, still with Calvo price-setting. Note
that the policymaker knows the persistence of the mark-up process, (set to 0.8). The chart
below reports what we ￿nd, starting from the same initial belief as before at ^ ￿0 = 0:7
13Once again we get self-con￿rming persistence of sorts. This time there is no slow drifting
down of ^ ￿. However, a caveat: relative to the other settings, we found it was particularly
hard to get convergence of the PEA in this setting. For many draws of shocks, we don￿ t get
convergence.
3.2 Flexible Prices
We turn next to the results with the central bank learning about indexation in an approxi-
mation to the ￿ exible price model: the Calvo model with the probability of prices being reset
equal almost to 1. Here we also see a steady learning down of the value of central bank￿ s
indexation estimate ^ ￿. This time the learning proceeds far more slowly than before, how-
ever. After 50k periods, the learned value of ^ ￿ has fallen by less than 0.0001. This holds for
regardless of initial beliefs (^ ￿0 = 0:5;0:3 reported below).











Central Bank's gamma Belief
(Initial Belief = 0.5)












Central Bank's gamma Belief
(Initial Belief = 0.3)
These simulations make contact with the work of Dittmar et al (2005) cited in the in-
troduction. They show that it is possible for a monetary policymaker to generate reduced
form in￿ ation persistence if monetary policy is set appropriately. That work prompts two
questions: is it possible to generate evidence of structural in￿ ation persistence by appropriate
chocie of monetary policy? And even if so, why would a monetary policymaker follow a mon-
etary policy that was so designed? Our simulations provide an answer: if the central bank is
trapped in the belief that the indexation model prevails, and sets monetary policy accordingly,
small sample estimates of the data will con￿rm this wrong belief even under ￿ exible prices.
3.3 Juillard et al (2007)
Finally we present our results where the central bank operates in a world where prices are set
according to Juillard et al (2007). Recall this is the model where each period that ￿rms get
to reset prices, they also get to reset the linear function they use to index prices for future
periods when they are unable to re-optimise. We present two variants of this environment.
In the ￿rst variant, just as with our simulations under Calvo and ￿ exible pricing, there is no
persistence in the mark-up shock.











Central Bank's gamma Belief
(No Persistence in Shock)
In this simulation, we observe that the central bank￿ s beliefs about indexation ^ ￿ fall to 0
much faster than in the other pricing models. ^ ￿ falls from an initial value of 0.7 to 0 within
2k periods. 2k periods is still a long time, however, if we take the quarterly frequency of the
model calibration literally, so although in￿ ation persistence is not strictly self con￿rming here
either, it is taking a long time (500 years!) to eradicate beliefs in intrinsic in￿ ation persistence.
In the second experiment using Juillard et al pricing, we make the mark-up shock follow
and AR(1) with autoregressive coe¢ cient of 0.8. We assume that policymakers know the
process governing the shock precisely.











Central Bank's gamma Belief
(Persistent Shock AR(1) = 0.8
Here the equilibrium is quite di⁄erent. From an initial value of 0.7, ^ ￿ falls to and then
￿ uctuates around a value around 0.18. In this model, in￿ ation persistence is self-con￿rming
and evolving around a low value. To repeat, the policymaker knows the persistence of the
shock process here, so this self-con￿rmation is not coming about because we are introducing
persistence into in￿ ation that it cannot see.
164 Conclusions
17Some controversy has arisen about whether there is intrinsic persistence in in￿ ation due to
the fact that ￿rms may index prices. Whether there is or not has implications for how
monetary policy responds to shocks. Indexation implies that monetary policy should be
more accommodative. It has been observed that estimates of in￿ ation persistence derived
either from reduced-form or structural econometrics are somewhat regime-dependent, strong
circumstancial evidence that such persistence is a product of the regime, and not intrinsic.
That evidence begs the question why policy might at some time and in some countries choose
higher in￿ ation persistence and at some time choose low in￿ ation persistence. In this paper we
have shown that if a central bank starts out with the misconception that there is indexation,
and engages in perpetual learning about this coe¢ cient, then it can ￿nd its false initial beliefs
e⁄ectively self-con￿rming. We have shown that this statement holds in a variety of settings:
Calvo, ￿ exible prices, and Juillard et al (2007). We qualify with ￿ e⁄ectively￿because we ￿nd
that in many settings, beliefs that in￿ ation is intrinsically persistent are eventually learned
away, but only very slowly. Under Calvo it takes about 50k periods to reduce an initial
estimate of in￿ ation persistence by 0.07; under ￿ exible prices such estimates fall by less
than 0.0001 over the same period. When indexation is a function of monetary policy, as in
Juillard et al (2007), if shocks are not persistent, central bank beliefs converge on zero in￿ ation
persistence within 2k periods. If shocks are persistent, beliefs settle and ￿ uctuate around a
value of 0.2.
Two questions we have not so far addressed are these. We have shown that given an
initial belief that in￿ ation is persistent, in￿ ation may be believed to be so for some time
after that. But this begs the question how the belief that in￿ ation is persistent arises in
the ￿rst place. Second, we have so far not said anything about the welfare consequences of
the self-con￿rmation in false beliefs about in￿ ation persistence. We con￿ne ourselves here to
remarking that the welfare implications will of course depend on what model explains price
setting in reality. If prices are sticky in the fashion posited by Calvo (1983), the welfare
consequences of setting policy conditional on a belief that there is indexation may be quite
severe. The overly accommodative response to shocks will generate price dispersion that
is costly. If, however, prices are ￿ exible, the process for in￿ ation chosen will matter less
for welfare. In the cashless limits studied in this paper, the costs of choosing the wrong
in￿ ation process under ￿ exible prices will be in￿nitessamlly small. In more realistic models
that articulate money demand, there will be welfare consequences. A volatile in￿ ation rate
will induce lower welfare.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we recap on the derivation of the Philips Curves under our three di⁄erent
models of price-setting, and in the model of indexation that characterises the central bank￿ s
delusion about our model worlds. We also recap on the derivation of optimal monetary policy
under indexation.
6 A: The New Keynesian Indexation Model
6.1 Households














The period budget constraint faced by the representative household in t=0,1,2,... is
Z 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di + QtBt ￿ Bt￿1 + WtNt + Jt
20and to ensure solvency we have
lim
T!1
Et fQt;t+TBt+Tg ￿ 0
















Consequently, one can reexpress the period budget constraint as
PtCt + QtBt ￿ Bt￿1 + WtNt + Jt

























and in their loglinearized form are
wt ￿ pt = ￿ct + ’nt




it ￿ ￿logQt + log￿
216.2 Firms
There is a continuum of ￿rms i 2 [0;1], with each ￿rm producing a di⁄erentiated good with
an identical technology, assumed to take the form:
Yt(i) = Atf(Nt(i)) = AtNt(i)
1￿￿
The variable cost of production is given by the wage bill




















6.2.1 Flexible Price Case
It is instructive to consider the case of ￿ exible prices due to its relevance for the steady state
of the indexation model. The markup, ￿, instituted by a monopolistically competitive ￿rm














Since, in equilibrium, we have all ￿rms producing the same quantity, equal to aggregate
production, we observe that marginal cost is then the inverse of the markup (￿ s = ￿￿1). In the
indexation model, this will be the case in steady state.
226.2.2 Optimal Price Setting
















For a ￿rm unable to reoptimze its price in period t+j, the price of its product will be
that in period t+j-1 multiplied by (gross) in￿ ation in period t+j-1 raised to the power ￿.








































Dividing through by Pt￿1 and log-linearizing around a zero in￿ ation steady state we obtain












^ st+kjt + (pt+k ￿ pt￿1) ￿ ￿ (pt+k￿1 ￿ pt￿1)
￿
Re-expressed (do lots of adding and subtracting of terms here) we have:
p
￿

























23Now, (see Gali Ch.3 P.7) we can express the log real marginal cost of a ￿rm in t+k, which
last reoptimized in t, in terms of the log average real marginal cost of the economy and a term
related to the deviation of the ￿rm￿ s price from the average price level:




























































1 ￿ ￿ + ￿"
￿
QD
t+s ￿ ￿t+s ￿ ￿￿t+s￿1
More usefully, the above can be re-expressed as
p
￿













6.2.3 Combining with Price Evolution














In the second term on the RHS above, the lagged aggregate price index Pt￿1 appears before
the scaled gross in￿ ation rate by a Law of Large Numbers argument. Given this expression for
the evolution of the price index, one can log-linearize around the zero in￿ ation steady state to
obtain
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)(p
￿



























= (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿^ st + ￿
QD






























(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿
^ st
6.2.4 Marginal Cost vs Output Deviations
Now, in order to express the economy￿ s average real marginal cost deviation in terms of output
deviations:
log(st) = wt ￿ pt ￿ mpnt






















at ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)
In the last line above, yn
t , represents the natural level of output that would attain under
￿ exible prices. As aforementioned, real marginal cost under ￿ exible prices is equal to the
inverse of the desired mark-up, ￿. Consequently we obtain
y
n
t = ￿ 
n
y;0 +  
n
y;aat






(1 ￿ ￿)(log￿ ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿))





￿ + ’ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿ +
’ + ￿
1 ￿ ￿
Thus we can express the log deviation of real marginal cost from steady state in terms of
the deviation in output from its natural level.
6.3 NKPC Under Indexation
Consequently we have the NKPC under indexation
￿
QD




(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿
~ yt ￿ yt ￿ y
n
t
To obtain the welfare-relevant output gap representation we use the identities
xt ￿ yt ￿ y
e
t






t is the e¢ cient level of output (which would be attained under ￿ exible prices in
the absence of market power distortions).
Consequently one obtains










We assume that "PC









Note, that the "normal" Calvo model can be obtained by setting ￿ = 0.
267 B: The Juillard et al Model
7.1 Households
The behavious of households is the same as in the NKI model above and thus the corresponding
derivations are omitted here.
7.2 Firms
As above, ￿rms maximize the expectation of a suitably discounted stream of pro￿ts in the
contingencies in which they are unable to reoptimize fully. However, unlike in the indexation
model above, ￿rms in this model do not update their prices according to lagged aggregate
in￿ ation whenever they are unable to reoptimize fully. Instead, on the occasions when they do
reoptimize, ￿rms not only choose a new price, Pt(i), but also an "individual (gross) in￿ ation
rate", vt(i), at which this price will be updated until the next opportunity to reoptimize. The



































































Noting that all ￿rms reoptimizing in t will choose the same control values one can rearrange




















































































2 + ^ vt








^ st+k + ^ ￿t+k
i
Concentrating ￿rst on the "price" FOC we multiply by (1 ￿ ￿￿) and then take expectations
of the next period version, multiplied by (1 ￿ ￿￿)
2.
^ pt + ^ vt
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿






^ st+k + ^ ￿t;k
i
(8)













Note the summation from k=1 in the square brackets above is correct since
^ ￿t+1;k = 0 k = 0
= ^ ￿
G
t+2 k = 1
= ^ ￿
G
t+2 + ::: + ^ ￿
G




t ￿ log(1 + ￿t) ￿ log1
= log(1 + ￿t)
￿ ￿t
28By de￿nition we therefore have
^ pt + ^ vt
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
= (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
￿
^ st + (￿￿)(^ st+1 + ￿t+1) + (￿￿)
2 (^ st+2 + ￿t+1 + ￿t+2) + :::
￿
(10)
(￿￿)Et [^ pt+1] +
(￿￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿
Et^ vt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
￿
(￿￿) ^ st+1 + (￿￿)
2 (^ st+2 + ￿t+2 + :::)
￿
(11)
Subtracting 11 from 10 yields
^ pt￿Et^ pt+1+(1 ￿ ￿￿)Et^ pt+1+
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
[^ vt ￿ Et^ vt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et^ vt+1] = (1 ￿ ￿￿) ^ st+￿￿Et￿t+1
Therefore
￿￿Et^ pt+1 ￿ ^ pt +
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
[Et^ vt+1 ￿ ^ vt] = ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)(^ st + ￿￿Et^ vt+1 ￿ ￿￿Et￿t+1) (12)












(￿￿)(^ st+1 + ￿t+1) + 2(￿￿)













2 (^ st+2 + ￿t+2) + 2(￿￿)
3 (^ st+3 + ￿t+2 + ￿t+3) + :::
￿
(14)
Subtracting 14 from 13 and then re-arranging we obtain
^ pt ￿ ￿￿Et^ pt+1 +
1 + ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
[^ vt ￿ ￿￿Et^ vt+1]
= Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)
2 Et
￿
^ st+1 + (￿￿)(^ st+2 + ￿t+2) + (￿￿)
2 (^ st+3 + ￿t+2 + ￿t+3) + :::
￿







k ^ st+1+k + Et
￿
(￿￿)￿t+2 + (￿￿)
2 (￿t+2 + ￿t+3) + :::
￿
)












Recalling 9 we obtain
[^ pt ￿ Et^ pt+1] +
1 + ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
[^ vt ￿ Et^ vt+1] = Et￿t+1 ￿ Et^ vt+1
Alternatively expressed:
29Et^ pt+1 = ^ pt + Et^ vt+1 ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿
1 + ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
[Et^ vt+1 ￿ ^ vt] (15)
Et^ pt+1 ￿ ^ pt = ￿
2￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿




Combining 12 and 15 we obtain
￿￿
￿
^ pt + Et^ vt+1 ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿
1 + ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
[Et^ vt+1 ￿ ^ vt]
￿
￿ ^ pt +
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
[Et^ vt+1 ￿ ^ vt]
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)(^ st + ￿￿Et^ vt+1 ￿ ￿￿Et￿t+1)
Rearrangement yields





(^ st ￿ ^ pt) (17)
7.3 The Price Index






















































1 = (1 ￿ ￿)p
1￿"




















In log-linearized from we have
0 = ^ pt + ￿(^ pt￿1 + ^ vt￿1 ￿ ￿t) + ￿








= ^ pt + ￿(^ pt￿1 + ^ vt￿1) + ￿





^ pt + (1 ￿ ￿)(^ pt￿1 + ^ vt￿1) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(^ pt￿2 + 2^ vt￿2 ￿ ￿t￿1) (18)
+￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(^ pt￿3 + 3^ vt￿2 ￿ ￿t￿2 ￿ ￿t￿1) + :::
7.4 Quasi-Di⁄erencing
Quasi-di⁄erencing 18 yields
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
^ pt + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ vt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(^ vt￿2 ￿ ￿t￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿




^ pt ￿ ￿￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ vt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿^ vt￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿





^ pt + ^  t (19)
^  t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ^ vt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿^ vt￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2^ vt￿3 + :::
Clearly the "inertial" variable ^  t evolves according to
^  t = ￿^  t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ vt￿1 (20)
Note, for future reference,
Et t+1 ￿  t = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ vt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ^  t (21)
7.5 Final In￿ ation Dynamics
7.5.1 Slope Evolution Equation
Combining 17 and 19 we have

















^  t (22)
317.5.2 In￿ ation Equation ("Phillips Curve")
Using 19 we obtain
Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿t =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
(Et^ pt+1 ￿ ^ pt) + Et^  t+1 ￿ ^  t
Combining this with 16, and 21 we have




















































+ ^ vt ((1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)) + ^  t
￿















+ ^ vt ((1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)) + ^  t
￿












If we collect the interest rate rule derived from the optimal policy problem in the indexation
model, equations 20, 22 and 23 from the Kumhof et al model, together with the IS curve, we
have the equations that describe the "comprehensive" model under analysis.
xt = Et [xt+1] ￿
1
￿


































+ ^ vt ((1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)) + ^  t
￿




























^  t = ￿^  t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ vt￿1
32xt = Et [xt+1] ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et [￿t+1]) + "
D
t





Et￿t+1 = ￿￿1￿t + ￿￿2^ vt + ￿￿3^  t + ￿￿4~ yt
Et^ vt+1 = ￿v1^ vt + ￿v2~ yt + ￿v3￿t + ￿v4^  t
^  t = ￿ 1^  t￿1 + ￿ 2^ vt￿1
or (gets a bit ugly)
1
￿￿1























































































￿t = ￿￿1Et￿t+1 + ￿￿2^ vt + ￿￿3^  t + ￿￿4xt + ￿￿5"
PC
t































￿2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
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338 C: Policy Rule Representations
















￿t ￿ ￿t￿t￿1 = ￿xt + ￿Et [￿t+1 ￿ ￿t￿t] + "t
xt = Et [xt+1] ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et [￿t+1])
"t = ￿"t￿1 + vt
which gives rise to a familiar marginal condition for optimality (with quasidi⁄erenced




(￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1) (24)
Substituting this into the Phillips Curve, solving forward and imposing a suitable TVC we
obtain
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 = ￿q"t (25)
q ￿
1
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿2
Using the last two equations in combination with the IS curve one can obtain various
representations of the interest rate rule that, in this model, would implement/be consistent
with optimal policy:
￿ Rule 1
it = ￿i1￿t + ￿i2￿t￿1
￿i1 ￿ ￿ +
￿￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿




￿ Rule 2 (from Rule 1 but substituting out ￿t using (25))
it = (￿i1￿ + ￿i2)￿t￿1 + ￿i1￿q"t
34￿ Rule 3
it = ￿i1￿t￿1 + ￿i2"t
￿i1 ￿ ￿
2
￿i2 ￿ q￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(￿ + ￿)
￿ Rule 4
it = ￿i1￿t + ￿i2￿t￿1
￿i1 ￿ ￿ +





(￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿)
￿ Rule 5 (from Rule 4 but substituting out ￿t using (25))
it = (￿i1￿ + ￿i2)￿t￿1 + ￿i1￿q"t
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